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ABSTRACT 
The effect of state aid has been widely discussed in the 
existing literature from a policy makers point of view, yet the 
business perspective on obtaining state aid has not.  This paper 
attempts to shed light on this viewpoint by examining 
potential factors affecting the aid intensity of state aid in 
Europe. It finds that the extent of state aid differs between 
countries, governing parties and the type of aid. Furthermore, 
it finds a general trend of decreasing aid intensities in Europe. 
Based on these findings, businesses can adapt their strategy to 
optimize their expected aid intensity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The European Commission’s (EC) 2016 decision, ruling the 
tax deal between Apple and the Republic of Ireland to be 
illegal state aid to the extent of €13 billion, has shown the 
significance of state aid in the European Union (EU) 
(European Commission, 2016a). Basis of this decision is the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which 
ensures in Article 107 that aid granted by a member state or 
through state resources does not distort competition and 
trade within the EU (Council of the European Union, 2012). 
By hindering that governments favor certain companies or 
the production of certain goods, the EC attempts to maintain 
fair market conditions. Nevertheless, cases such as the one 
involving Apple come up on a frequent basis, with more 
than €101.2 billion of state aid being approved in 2014 
(European Commission, 2016a). Amounting to 0.72% of the 
European GDP in 2014, it is of great importance for firms to 
understand the factors affecting the extent of state aid in the 
EU.  
 
This paper investigates the question of: What are the factors 
influencing the extent to which government is willing to 
provide state aid to non-state actors? Taking the aid 
intensity, measured by the percentage of a projects costs 
covered by state aid, as a dependent variable, this paper will 
evaluate the impact of the following factors: The region 
within Europe; the political party in power; the type of state 
aid and the timing of the application. By regressing these 
against aid intensity, this adds to the existing literature by 
taking a business point of view on state aid, contrary to the 
more commonly discussed policy makers point of view. 
This approach may lead to findings that indicate how a firm 
can optimize its strategy in its effort to obtain state aid. In 
order to do so, this paper begins by defining state aid before 
analyzing the existing literature on this topic. Following 
this, the methodology will be outlined. Furthermore, this 
paper will then describe and analyze the results of the  
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research. Finally, it will conclude by elaborating on the 
implications of the findings and outlining the limitations.  
 
State Aid in Europe 
A high-level view of state aid and the EU’s classification 
thereof serves to illustrate its role for governments and 
businesses, permitting a detailed investigation into factors 
affecting aid intensity. In order to control state aid in the EU, 
a ‘Transparency System for Regional Aid for Large 
Investment Projects’ was created by the EC, in which state aid 
must be requested by any EU government based on the 
following definition: It is an “advantage in any form 
whatsoever conferred on a selective basis to business projects 
by national public authorities” (European Commission, 
2016b). Therefore, subsidies granted to individuals or general 
measures open to all enterprises are not covered by this 
prohibition and do not constitute state aid. To qualify as 
illegal state aid, a measure must show the following features 
(European Commission, 2016b): 
• There has been an intervention by the state or through state 
resources (e.g. grants or interest and tax reliefs, etc.). 
• The intervention gives the recipient an advantage on a 
selective basis, for example to specific companies or 
industry sectors. 
• Competition has been or may be distorted. 
• The intervention is likely to affect trade between member 
states.  
Aid Intensity and Absolute Value of Aid 
Having defined state aid, it is important to quantify state aid 
for the purpose of this paper. To do so, there are two possible 
measures: The absolute amount of aid and the ‘aid intensity’. 
The latter is defined as the maximum level of public funding 
that can be given to a project expressed as a percentage of the 
total costs eligible for support (European Commission, 
2016b). While the absolute amount of aid might seem to be 
the most important factor for firms at first sight, it is strongly 
dependent on the nature and the size of the project. 
Additionally, aid intensity simplifies the comparison between 
different projects and according to Ginevičius et al. (2008), it 
is better than the absolute value in predicting the effectiveness 
and impact of aid. Altogether, aid intensity appears to be the 
more appropriate variable to analyze the extent of state aid. 
Potential Factors 
Considering the literature on this topic, not much research 
has been done specifically on the factors affecting the 
intensity of state aid. The focus is generally rather on foreign 
aid and its effects or the effectiveness of state aid from a 
policy makers’ perspective. However, several authors have 
made findings which suggest that certain factors might have 
an impact on aid intensity. Taking the political party in 
power on a national level as a first potential factor, Thérien 
and Noël (2000) found that there is an effect of the 
governing party on foreign aid in the long run. Bringing this 
to a European level, McElroy and Benoit (2010) wrote that 
party affiliation in Europe is primarily based on policy 
congruence, inferring that parties with similar stances on 
state aid will support the same political group on a European 
level. Therefore, the government’s affiliation on an EU level 
might be a proxy for its opinion on state aid. An example 
would be that the European Peoples Party (EPP) would 
present similar views as the Dutch center-right party CDA. 
Another relevant factor might be the region the state aid is 
provided in. Kriesi (2016) divides Europe into three regions 
(Northwest, South and Central East) and finds that the EU is 
perceived differently by the people and governments, 
particularly with regard to its purpose. Following Kriesi, 
politicians in Central and Eastern Europe “tend to see the 
EU as a ‘cash cow to be milked’” (Kriesi, 2016, p.43). This 
difference in perception might lead to a different behavior 
towards granting state aid. Another finding which could 
have implications on the aid intensity is that certain types of 
state aid are more likely to be supported by politicians 
(Hainz and Hakanes, 2009). More specifically, Hainz and 
Hakanes (2009) found that politicians prefer granting 
subsidized loans over direct subsidies, indicating that the 
type of aid is a factor to be considered by firms when 
applying for state aid.  
 
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN:  
In order to evaluate the relevance of the aforementioned 
potential factors, this paper uses clustering, ANOVA and 
multiple linear regression. Based on the prior definition of 
state aid and the ‘Transparency system for regional aid and 
large investment projects’, the European Commission offers 
a public database on the intensity of granted state aid. This 
means that all approved state aid exceeding €300,000 over 
three fiscal years is in this database, excluding investments 
in R&D&I and railway infrastructure. Additionally, it 
provides the following data for each case: the country 
granting aid, the date of award and the type of aid. In order 
to test the influence of the governing party, the variable 
political party in power is added. The data sample consists 
of all 529 observations from 2003 – 2014. 
 
Using this data, the paper will analyze the factors leading to 
successful government aid by first subjecting the ‘awarding 
country’ variable to hierarchical clustering before then 
testing with a one-way ANOVA if aid intensity is dependent 
on the political party in power.  Lastly, it runs a multiple 
linear regression with aid intensity as a dependent variable. 
Using the clustering results, the following linear regression 
model was estimated: !"#	%&'(&)"'* = , + ./ 012&'3*_052)'(3(#+ .6 !"#_7*8(+ .9 :15"'";<5_:<3'* + .= 73(&#+ > 
Variables 
Aid_Type: This variable refers to the type of aid granted by 
the national governments. Considering only the types which 
were the most important component in at least one state aid 
case granted from 2003 – 2014, the EC differentiates 
between ‘grants’, ‘tax credits and other tax measures’ and 
‘tax allowance and tax exemptions’. The former three are 
similar as they are all transferred in full to the recipient. This 
is different to the category ‘tax allowance and tax 
exemptions’, which is dependent on having a tax liability. 
Any excess amount will not be paid out (European 
Commission, 2016b). Based on this information the dummy 
variables D_TaxNonDep, and D_TaxDep will be used for 
the regression, using D_Grant as a baseline. 
 
Political_Party: This variable refers to the party with the 
most seats in parliament in the country in which the state aid 
was authorized. To make this variable comparable, each 
party’s European counterpart is used as a dummy variable. 
This results in the following variables: D_EPP for the 
conservative, center-right European Peoples Party; D_PES 
for the social-democratic, center-left Party of European 
Socialists; D_ALDE for the liberal center Alliance of 
Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party; and D_ACRE for 
the center-right Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists in 
Europe. In a year in which an election takes place, the party 
with the most seats over the majority of the year will be 
considered the awarding party. An exception to this is the 
Slovenian party ‘Pozitivna Slovenija’, which is considered 
part of ALDE due to the recent political alignments in 
Slovenia. Even though they are not formally part of this 
alliance, they have applied to be before deciding to not join 
any European party. 
 
Trend: This variable refers to the year the aid is awarded in, 
taking 2003 as a baseline. By doing so, the variable controls 
for a trend in giving out higher/lower aid intensities in 
general. It variable is computed by the formula:  73(&# = (@(<3	<A<3#(# − 2003) 
 
DATA ANALYSIS: 
Clustering of countries 
Kriesi (2016) found that Europe’s states can be grouped into 
‘Northern and Western Europe’ (NWE), ‘Southern Europe’ 
(SE) and ‘Central and Eastern Europe’ (CEE) based on their 
perception of the EU and their political activity. This 
clustering is later referred to as traditional grouping. In order 
to test whether this also extends to the aid intensity with which 
these countries give out state aid, a one-way ANOVA and 
Tukey HSD test was performed. While the ANOVA test 
confirmed that the means are different at the 1% significance 
level, the Tukey HSD test showed that the Hypothesis that SE 
and NWE have different means could not. In order to further 
improve this grouping, hierarchical clustering was used to 
group together the countries based on the intensity of the state 
aid they gave out in the time from 2003 – 2014. The results of 
this grouping suggested that there are 5 clusters with France, 
Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom in the cluster with the 
lowest mean aid intensity. The cluster of countries with the 
highest mean aid intensity consists only of Poland. Further 
running an ANOVA test on this grouping confirms different 
means at the 1% significance level. The Tukey HSD test 
further shows that all means are different at the 1% level aside 
of group 4 and 5. Based on this these two groups are combined 
for the further course of this paper. These groups are referred 
to as C_Grp1, C_Grp2, etc. respectively (See table 1). 
 
Table 1: Cluster allocation by country (Aid Intensity in%) 
Cluster Allocation Mean 
1 Germany 19.5 
2 France, Ireland, Italy, United Kingdom 8.5 
3 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, 
Sweden 
12.9 
4 Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, 
Romania 
26.3 
5 Poland 27.9 
 
ANOVA of political party in power 
Analyzing the previously defined variable Political_Party 
with an ANOVA test, it confirms at the 1% significance level 
that the mean aid intensity differs per awarding party. Going 
more into detail with a Tukey HSD test, it can be seen that the 
difference stems from the party ALDE, which mean is 
significantly different from all other parties. In comparison, 
the other parties’ means do not differ significantly. 
 
Figure 1: Mean aid intensity per governing party 
 
Considering these results the dummy variable D_ALDE is 
added to the database taking all other political parties as the 
baseline. This variable is 1 if the previously defined 
political_party is equal to ALDE and 0 otherwise.   
 
Regression Analysis 
In order to get an overall view on the factors affecting aid 
intensity, this paper uses multiple linear regression. The 
model is based on the previous findings and operationalizes 
as:  !"#	%&'(&)"'* = , + ./ G_0_H382 + .6 G_0_H383+ .9 G_0_H384&5+ .= G_7<LG(8(&#(&'+ .M G_7<LN1&G(8(&#(&'+ .O G_!PGQ + .R 73(&# + > 
 
This model results in an adjusted R² of 0.373 with all variables 
significant on the 1% level as shown in the following output: 
 
Table 2: Output of multiple linear regression with Aid 
Intensity as dependent variable 
 
 
The output suggests that on average countries in group 2 
(France, Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom) and group 3 
(Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Spain, Sweden) are expected to grant aid at a 9.1% and 7.1% 
lower aid intensity respectively compared to Germany. Aid in 
countries from group 4 and 5 (Czech Republic, Greece, 
Hungary, Rumania and Poland) are expected to have an 
average intensity of 6.3% higher than Germany. Considering 
the type of aid, both ‘tax credits and other tax 
measures’(Tax_NonD) and ‘tax allowance and tax 
exemptions’(Tax_Dep) are on average expected to have a 
6.8% and 4.3% higher aid intensity relative to grants. 
Concerning the party with the most seats in parliament in the 
aid awarding country, if this party is affiliated with ALDE the 
aid is on average expected to be 6.4% lower relative to a 
country where it is not the case. Furthermore, according to the 
model, aid intensity has on average dropped by 0.6% yearly 
since 2003. Interpreting the constant and to give a typical 
case, state aid granted in Germany as a grant by an EPP 
majority government in 2003 would be expected to have an 
aid intensity of 22.4%. 
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Aid intensity differences by country 
Considering the results of the ANOVA test, it can be said that 
there are differences in the aid intensity based on the region 
the country is in. Grouping the countries in NWE, SE and 
CEE, it can be confirmed that the means of aid intensities in 
these areas differ significantly. This shows that Kriesi’s 
(2016) findings of political difference between these regions 
also extends to the state aid granted by these countries, with 
the mean aid intensity in CEE countries being almost 10% 
higher than in NWE and SE. Examining the countries that 
have given state aid falling under the ‘Transparency System 
for Regional Aid for Large Investment Projects’, the two 
group of countries with highest aid intensity consist mainly of 
CEE countries. The only exception to this is Greece. Further, 
three of the ‘Big 4 European Countries’ (United Kingdom, 
Germany, France and Italy) as defined by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2008) 
are grouped together as the countries with the lowest aid 
intensity. The only exception is Germany with a much higher 
aid intensity compared to the rest of group two and three. 
Furthermore, there are 10 countries which have not granted 
state aid under the prior definition. These countries are 
Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovenia. With regard to 
this, it must be noted that Croatia only joined the EU in 2013, 
which might have led to a reduced number of state aid 
reported. In conclusion, it can be said that among the aid-
giving countries, the average aid intensity in the groups 5, 4 
and 1 is the highest respectively. Therefore, firms seeking to 
maximize state aid intensity can be advised to apply for aid in 
these countries.  
 
Difference by political party in power 
Analyzing the effect of the political party in power, the only 
parties with significantly different aid intensities from the 
mean are those affiliated with ALDE. This is confirmed by 
the results of the Tukey HSD test and further supported by the 
results of the regression. Based on this model, it can be 
expected that countries governed by parties affiliated with 
ALDE on average give state aid with 6.4% lower aid intensity 
(See table 2). For businesses interested in receiving high-
intensity state aid this means that countries governed by such 
parties should be avoided.  
 
Difference by type of aid 
With regard to the type of aid that was granted, a significant 
difference was found in the regression model. Comparing 
‘grants’, ‘tax credits and other tax measures’ and ‘tax 
allowance and tax exemptions’, the latter two tend to be 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
EPP PES ALDE ACRE Total
Mean	aid	intensity	per	governing	party
	
Coefficientsa	
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) .224 .013  16.901 .000 
C_Grp2 -.091 .015 -.265 -6.008 .000 
C_Grp3 -.071 .013 -.227 -5.254 .000 
C_Grp4_5 .063 .012 .237 5.271 .000 
Tax_NonD .068 .017 .149 3.977 .000 
Tax_Dep .043 .012 .142 3.692 .000 
D_ALDE -.064 .022 -.111 -2.933 .004 
Trend -.006 .001 -.158 -4.307 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: AidIntensity 
characterized by higher aid intensities. On average, ‘tax 
credits and other tax measures’ and ‘tax allowance and tax 
exemptions’ are expected to have a 6.3% and 4.3% higher aid 
intensity respectively compared to grants (See table 2). For 
firms aiming to receive state aid, applying for these two types 
of aid tends to be beneficial. 
 
Trend 
Regarding the regression model, the variable trend is 
significant at the 1% level. Interpreted, this means that the 
average aid intensity is expected to drop by 0.6% annually 
since 2003. This confirms Collie’s (2000) point of view that 
the EC have been working towards reducing the extent of state 
aid. For companies, this means that it can be advised to apply 
for state aid as early as possible in order to avoid the negative 
trend. 
 
Limitations and suggestions for further research 
Based on the build-up of this study, a number of limitations 
must be mentioned. The first and possibly most important is 
based on the characteristic of the data source. While the 
database offers good insight in the state aid granted in Europe, 
it excludes a variety of other cases in which companies receive 
state aid. Such examples include aid valued at less than 
€300,000; research and development subsidies or investments 
in railway systems. Additionally, cases such as the previously 
mentioned one about Apple are not recorded, as tax 
agreements are generally not considered state aid by the 
contracting country. Furthermore, several aid cases received 
additional funds over the course of time. Due to the lack of 
data on each additional round of funding, only the earliest date 
is considered in this paper. This might have skewed the trend 
as well as the political_party variable. Further, it must be 
noted that hierarchical clustering was used for combining 
nominal and scale data, something that is not recommended. 
Lastly, it must be said that 10 countries did not grant aid under 
this scheme and therefore were not analyzed. Overall, this 
paper researched the effect of certain factors on aid intensity 
while neglecting the cases that were rejected by the EC or 
national governments. This leaves great room for further 
research to determine what characteristics increase the 
chances of state aid being approved by the government.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the results it is recommended for aid seeking firms 
in Europe to consider the following factors: The choice of 
country, the type of aid, the political party in power and the 
timing of the application. With regard to the country, the 
deviations in aid intensity are particularly large. Particularly 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary and Romania 
are characterized by extensive state aid. In comparison, there 
are 10 countries which have not granted state aid under the 
analyzed framework from 2003 – 2014. Considering the type 
of state aid, this paper finds that aid with a tax-related payout 
scheme is expected to have significantly higher aid intensity. 
Furthermore, it is advised to apply for state aid in countries 
not governed by ALDE-affiliated parties, as this significantly 
reduced the expected aid intensity. Lastly, there appears to be 
a negative trend concerning the aid intensity in Europe from 
2003 - 2014. This leads to the conclusion that firms should 
apply for state aid as soon as possible in order to avoid further 
progression of the previously mentioned trend. Overall, this 
research suggests that the level of state aid can to a certain 
extent be influenced by companies, hence a thorough analysis 
in the process of requesting state aid is advised and should be 
part of the overall business case. This analysis should consider 
the following 4 pieces of advice for maximizing the intensity 
of state aid in Europe:  
• Apply in countries such as Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Greece, Hungary or Romania 
• Apply for state aid with a tax-related payout scheme 
• Apply in countries not governed by ALDE-affiliated 
parties 
• Avoid the trend of decreasing aid intensities in 
Europe 
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